How climbing Longs Peak led me to lessons in adaptive leadership, Karl Weick's sensemaking theory, and the power of embracing uncertainty.

Let’s set the scene…

There’s nothing like a mountain mission going sideways at every turn to remind you just how much you still have to learn about adaptive leadership—and about adjusting when things don’t go as planned. A few weeks ago, I had one of those experiences with my climbing partner during our first mountaineering attempt of Longs Peak.

Now, to be fair, we’re both new to this kind of alpine travel. We both had strapped on our first pair of crampons this season. I just wrapped up my avalanche safety course—he hadn't taken his yet. He had just completed his first intro to mountaineering class, and I hadn’t done that either. But we figured our backcountry experience could carry us: he’s a hunter, and I’m a three-season thru-hiker. We assumed, between the two of us, we could stitch together the knowledge we needed to make our first winter alpine mission a success.

That may have been our first mistake.

Or maybe it was the fact that, in true non-alpinist fashion, we didn’t even roll out of bed until 9 a.m. to make the drive—and made our way to the park laissez-fair, since we planned to just spend an afternoon through the 5 miles of “flat” lands to basecamp, peak bagging the next day. Or maybe it was assuming we could move as fast as usual, despite several store stops on the way there, and on arrival several feet of fresh snowfall to hike through, just because we had crampons and snowshoes and “time’. (Spoiler: we could not and did not.)

And yet, we were trying to do things right. We checked the weather. We tracked avalanche reports. We stopped by the backcountry office at Rocky Mountain National Park to gather intel, and turned on our GPS trackers. We packed, repacked, double-checked our ten essentials.

But we hadn’t planned for getting lost on the way to the visitor center—only to find it closed—adding an hour and a half of backtracking. We didn’t factor in that we’d be stepping onto the trail at 6:30 p.m., just as the sun was setting. By the time we pitched our four-season tent in the snow around 10 p.m., and slept past sunrise without an alpine alarm, and the facing slope of the avalanche terrain was still showing “meh” on the (surprisingly in service) cell phone app, it was clear we needed to do some serious course-correcting.

*Prepping camp at 10pm means packing snow for flat sleeping spaces before the tent goes up*

The question wasn’t whether we would summit Longs Peak. The question had become: how were we making sense of the choices we’d made, the assumptions we brought with us, and the changing conditions that now surrounded us?

What might look like a just outdoor challenge is, in reality, a case study in one of the most vital leadership skills: adapting under uncertainty. This is the essence of sensemaking, a concept introduced by organizational theorist Karl Weick, describing how people interpret evolving situations through real-time action, reflection, and adjustment (Weick, 1995).

What Is Sensemaking?

Weick's concept of sensemaking emerged from studying organizational collapse—most notably the Mann Gulch wildfire disaster. The first time i heard this story was in studying for my Doctorate at USC and it was the memory of the story was vivid enough, and terrible enough, that even tough i forgot about “sensemaking” before researching this article, I remembered the story of its intent clear as day. The Mann Gulch wildfire of 1949 had a team of fifteen elite smokejumpers respond, a new program to the Forest Service at the time, known for its dangers but introduced to quickly access the source of remote fires and prevent out of control scenarios. Upon landing, these fifteen smokejumpers struggled to adapt as conditions rapidly deteriorated (Weick, 1993). As the high winds picked up the men were rapidly surrounded, but the quick thinking of one man was to not run from the fire but to build an escape fire - to burn the land around them to destroy the “fuel” and provide a sheltered location for the flame to not spread (Forest History Society). His actions saved two other men that trusted his process and stayed; those that allowed the confusion to overtake them ran away instead… and did not survive. The tragedy didn’t stem from lack of skill, but from a breakdown in how people processed unfolding events. When interpretations failed to evolve with changing data, survival strategies unraveled.

Weick used this scenario to institutionalize the concept of “sensemaking”. The simple Wikipedia definition is:

Sensemaking or sense-making is the process by which people give meaning to their collective experiences. It has been defined as "the ongoing retrospective development of plausible images that rationalize what people are doing" (Weick, Sutcliffe, & Obstfeld, 2005, p. 409).

Wikipedia also says that the definition is not agreed to have a specific definition, if its about the individual or the group or done always or in extreme cases, so let me go on a ledge here and make my own definition:

Sensemaking is not letting you throw rationality, training, identity or logic out the window in your decision-making process because emotions were allowed to take over in any given scenario or circumstances.

Even writing that I can hear my military background leak out, but I would postulate that this is recognizable in many scenarios across every organization. Perhaps its making a decision like ours about whether to make a summit attempt of Longs Peak. Or deciding if you should take your tour group into unsafe weather conditions even though not going leads to very angry customers. Perhaps you as a manager have an employee that absolutely annoys you to no end, but you know they’ve performed the best in the office and now you have to recognize them for it with a role that makes you work with them even more.

*Trying not to let those Bluebird Days lull my decision-making.*

The Seven Characteristics of Sensemaking:

Now here’s where I admit I have not read the 183 page (and what i found $185 in academic libraries?!?!?!) book called Sensemaking in Organizations by Karl Weick (1995). But lucky for us someone else did, and from Barbara Czarniawska’s full book report we can at least gain some valuable insights (click her name for the link to the full report).

First, let’s talk Identity Construction.

Weick argues that sensemaking begins with who we believe we are, because identity shapes how we interpret cues and construct narratives. Czarniawska supports this by highlighting Weick’s focus on frames—social, organizational, or personal schemas that influence meaning-making—and how these are rooted in both tradition and one’s individual life, what she calls, “projects".”

Good ole Barbara also gives us a good recap of the six other characteristics that Weick believes that sensemaking covers. Here’s the summary:

Retrospective
Sense is made after the fact. Czarniawska points out that sensemaking connects a “cue” to an existing “frame,” often in hindsight. For example, the story of participants interpreting ambiguous data only after being prompted reflects this characteristic clearly.
My interpretation: make time where you can to look before you leap. In the Mann Gulch story, the ones that ran reacted so quickly that they could not see the consequences of their actions till after the fact. They just saw another fire. But those that slowed down to look at the next step and understand were able to absorb “after the fact” results in the moment
Enactive of the Environment
Actions shape the environment that people then interpret. Czarniawska notes that belief-driven and action-driven sensemaking intertwine—people act, then make sense of the consequences, which reshapes future belief. This also connects with Weick’s notion of the self-fulfilling prophecy.
My interpretation: Plan ahead and stick to the plan. One of the biggest lessons I took on my Longs Peak trip was from my avalanche course which was that you MUST stick to the avalanche plan. Don’t judge conditions “in the moment” because your excitement, your desire for the summit, the “bluebird” day could all make you believe that the mountains are safe, when the avalanche report said likely unstable. We chose to not summit because we stuck to our plan, and had a great snow-play day practicing self arrests.
Social
Sensemaking happens through interaction. Czarniawska discusses the inherently social nature of Weick’s framing. She highlights narrative repair and collective discussion as central to how people co-construct meaning.
My interpretation: Don’t fall for group think OR the expert trap. This is an important conversation in the mountains, but also in business decisions. We all tend to lean on our experts and just go with what they have to say, or, sometimes we go with whatever the masses say because that’s the popular choice instead of what you know to be the most correct choice. EITHER scenario allows for error because someone’s voice - someone who has an unmentioned injury/food shortage/gear issue, someone with better business knowledge/current market data/subject expertise - is being silenced and not being shared to help frame a decision that makes better sense for the scenario taking place. Making sure the social dynamics do not dilute essential information is imperative.
Ongoing
Sensemaking is never finished—even routine events can become sites of sensemaking when disrupted. Czarniawska notes that sensemaking intensifies during ruptures or discontinuities but never fully stops, much like the ethnomethodological idea of “repair.”
My interpretation: Everyone in business loves a good hotwash. And a good hotwash will always help you learn how to make sense of the decisions you made in the present, and help frame what makes “more” sense in the future.
Focused on Extracted Cues
People attend to selected cues to reduce complexity. The review references how Weick emphasizes connecting small cues to larger frames (inspired by Goffman). These extracted cues allow individuals to navigate overwhelming data.
My Interpretation: Adapt to what you see as new instead of relying on your old patterns. Look for the cues that indicate that this scenario is new to you, and make decisions that aren’t just “what we’ve always done here.”
Plausibility over Accuracy
Czarniawska suggests this as Weick’s most controversial point: people prioritize coherence and resonance over factual accuracy. Czarniawska quotes him directly: what matters is "something that preserves plausibility and coherence… something that is reasonable and memorable… a good story.” This aligns with Weick's emphasis on storytelling as the primary method of sensemaking.
My Interpretation: Don’t focus so much on building your plan to be 100% and allow it to put you into decision paralysis. Rather, if you think you have a 90% plan that will work, commit to that decision rather than waiting to act. The foreman that committed to his training and knowledge of escape fires, and acted on it immediately upon thought saved lives. Those that stopped to think were lost. That’s how lives can be lost, but also how business opportunities can be lost.

We Didn’t Summit - But We Made Sense

As you’ve probably gathered by now, we didn’t bag a peak that day—or summit in layman’s terms. After waking to fresh snowfall and realizing how underprepared we were on both timing and avalanche risk, we made a different choice: we’d stay below and use the day to share knowledge instead of chase elevation.

We ran through what we’d each learned from avalanche courses—rescue techniques, snowpack testing, rope care—and even covered some basic gear hacks to secure gear. (My partner found out the hard way why you always secure your ice axe… which fell out of his pack the night before. If we’d known that earlier, we wouldn’t have considered the summit at all. Never head into alpine terrain without your ice axe!)

Still, the bluebird day that could have lured us into risky terrain turned out to be one of the best training sessions we’ve had. We played in gullies and valleys near Chasm Lake, applying and reinforcing the skills we’re trying to master. I may still be a novice, but practicing in real conditions—without the pressure of a summit—made me feel a little more like a true alpinist. Someone who can not only make decisions, but step back from a goal when the gut says no.

That’s what sensemaking looks like: using what you know, taking time to interpret your scenario, and adjusting your plan—not based on want or pressure, but on real-time judgment. Lucky for me, that meant avoiding a survival scenario like the one in the Mann Gulch fire. And I hope I continue to make choices like that—not just on mountains, but in life and leadership.

Reflecting on that day helped me re-ground my understanding of Weick’s sensemaking theory. It reminded me that the same skills that keep us safe outdoors—reading cues, resisting urgency, and choosing plausibility over impulse—can help us lead better in the workplace too. If we can all bring just a little more sensemaking into how we approach challenge and uncertainty, we might all become better climbers—and better leaders—in the process.

Additional Academic References

For those of you out there that are looking for a more academic approach, I was able to locate a few potential resources for you to explore. Given the academic nature of these pieces (and the cost) it may be best to enroll in an academic library access rather than buying these books individually such as through your alumni programs.

Ancona, D. (2012). Sensemaking: Framing and acting in the unknown. In S. Snook, N. Nohria, & R. Khurana (Eds.), The Handbook for Teaching Leadership (pp. 3–19). Sage Publications.

Maitlis, S. (2005). The social processes of organizational sensemaking. Academy of Management Journal, 48(1), 21–49. https://doi.org/10.5465/amj.2005.15993111

Maitlis, S., & Christianson, M. (2014). Sensemaking in organizations: Taking stock and moving forward. Academy of Management Annals, 8(1), 57–125. https://doi.org/10.1080/19416520.2014.873177

Snowden, D. J., & Boone, M. E. (2007). A leader’s framework for decision making. Harvard Business Review, 85(11), 68–76.

Weick, K. E. (1993). The collapse of sensemaking in organizations: The Mann Gulch disaster. Administrative Science Quarterly, 38(4), 628–652. https://doi.org/10.2307/2393339

Weick, K. E. (1995). Sensemaking in organizations. Sage Publications.

Weick, K. E., & Sutcliffe, K. M. (2001). Managing the unexpected: Ass

During high performance in an age of complexity. Jossey-Bass.

Snowstorms, Strategy & Sensemaking: Leadership Lessons from the Mountains